This paper investigates the impact of the economic cycle on the loss given default (LGD) of mobile leases. Our data set, which was provided by two major German leasing companies, contains 53,944 defaulted contracts and covers the period between 1993 and 2004. The underlying assets are segmented into three classes: vehicles, ICT equipment, and machinery.
Introduction
Recently, leasing has become increasingly important as a means of financing. According to the Federal Association of German Leasing Companies, the leasing quota, which is defined as the leasing share of equipment investment, rose from 11.5% in 1995 to 19 .2% in 2005.
For mobile leases, this figure even added up to nearly one fourth (24.6%) last year.
On the one hand, this popularity offers good chances for growth to leasing companies, but it also poses challenges with regard to their credit risk management and their own refinancing at banks because of a higher capital requirement.
In this context, the regulations of the Basel II capital framework, which are going to become effective by the end of the year 2006, play an essential role. Although leasing companies in Germany are not subject to banking supervisory review, Basel II is expected to have an impact on the leasing business as well. Concretely, leasing companies which are subsidiaries of banks are obligated to charge the claims against their lessees with regulatory capital. Furthermore, leasing companies are classified according to their creditworthiness with regard to their own refinancing at banks. In order to obtain a favorable rating, it is also in the interest of bank-independent lessors to apply the regulations of Basel II to their lease portfolios.
Within the scope of the Advanced IRB Approach of Basel II, the loss given default (LGD) plays an essential role, because this variable must be estimated with an internal model.
According to § 468 of the framework document, the estimated LGD must reflect economic downturn conditions, where necessary, to capture the relevant risks 3 . This so-called downturn
LGD cannot be lower than the long-term default-weighted average LGD of the underlying data observation period. Before a downturn LGD is able to be estimated, it is necessary to gain empirical insights concerning historical loss severities and their sensitivity to the macroeconomic environment.
In this paper, we analyse the impact of economic conditions on the LGD of mobile lease contracts and submit a proposal for the estimation of a downturn LGD according to the requirements of § 468. Our data comes from two major German leasing companies and and communication technology, machinery, and other assets.
The following section provides a quick overview of the literature regarding the LGD of lease contracts. In section 3, we outline the data, our default definition, and the procedure for the calculation of the LGD. In addition, we introduce the concept of the " resurrection rate". The fourth section is devoted to some descriptive analyses concerning the level and distribution of the LGD. Using regression analyses, we investigate in section 5 whether the
LGDs of different asset types exhibit a cyclical variability or not. In section 6, we propose a simple approach for the estimation of a downturn LGD and demonstrate its application with an empirical example. Finally, section 7 draws a conclusion.
Review of the Literature
Whereas a variety of empirical studies analyzing the LGD of defaulted bonds or bank loans 4 exist, quite little research has been carried out on the severity of losses of defaulted lease contracts, especially for the German market.
De Laurentis/Geranio (2002) conducted a survey for the European leasing market through three different types of assets (automobiles, equipment and real estate). The authors calculated LGD averages and volatility levels of nearly 3,000 defaulted contracts and found that leasing companies generally incur rather low losses in the event of default.
Schmit/Stuyck (2002) confirmed this result for a much larger data set of 37,000 defaulted leases (from twelve companies in six different European countries). In addition, they investigated the impact of the age and the term-to-maturity on the average LGD of a given lease portfolio. Using non-parametric tests they also checked whether there is a relation between the year of default and the level of LGD. For most of the considered countries and asset types the authors found only weak evidence and concluded that the
LGD is quite resistant to a change in the macroeconomic environment. However, the situation in Germany was not considered.
Based on a rather small sample of 1,000 defaulted contracts, De Laurentis/Riani (2005) analyzed determinants of LGD for the Italian leasing market. They detected that LGD (on contract level) is affected not only by asset-related variables (for example asset type, original value) but also by non-asset-related variables such as the type of business, the form of organization, and the geographic area of the defaulted lessee. 4 For a good overview of the literature see, for example, Altman et al. (2003) 
or BCBS (2005a).
The study conducted by Schmit (2004) is devoted to the estimation of the loss distribution and the related risk quantiles for a portfolio of nearly 47,000 mobile lease contracts (thereof circa 4,300 defaulted) by applying a non-parametric simulation technique. The same method is used in the work of Laurent/Schmit (2005) . They simulated LGD distributions of defaulted vehicle leases (6,093 contracts) for different phases of the business cycle. It is shown that the level of the risk quantiles is more or less constant over time and is therefore relatively independent of macroeconomic conditions. This conclusion is in line with the above-mentioned study conducted by Schmit/Stuyck (2002 LGD for a given asset class. Furthermore, with nearly 54,000 defaulted contracts, the following study is based on a very extensive data set which exclusively refers to the German Leasing market 5 .
Data Description

Overview
The database used for this study comes from two major German leasing companies and (see table 1 ), we decided to make a coarser classification of the contracts according to the following four asset types: vehicles, ICT equipment, machinery, and other assets. Table 2 shows the distribution of the defaulted leases over time.
5 Our survey extends the article by Hartmann-Wendels/Winter (2005), in which some preliminary analyses for a part of our data set have already been conducted. 6 The last-mentioned category is quite heterogeneous and contains, for example, medical equipment, containers, fork-lift trucks, or industrial facilities.
Asset type
Number of leases Percent of total (%) The small number of contracts in 2004 can be traced back to the fact that the process of data collection did not cover the whole year. Apart from information concerning the asset type and the year of default, our database contains several variables that allow for the calculation of the LGD of a contract: risk position of the leasing company at default (exposure-at-default), amount of the revenue from asset resale, and amount of other payments to the lessor after default. For some leases the exact date of default is known, too.
Definition and Measurement of LGD
In general, LGD is defined as the fraction of credit exposure that will not be recovered in the event of the borrower´s default. Several studies also use the term recovery rate, which is equal to one minus LGD. Basically, there are two different ways of measuring LGD for a certain facility.
LGD can be calculated either from observed market prices soon 7 after the default event (market LGD) or from cash-flows within the workout process (workout LGD) 8 .
For defaulted bonds and marketable loans it is possible to obtain market LGDs by calculating the ratio between the current market price and the nominal value. In the case of instruments which are not traded in the market, such as lease contracts or non-marketable loans, the method of workout LGD must be applied. The idea of this procedure is as follows: all relevant cash-flows resulting from the workout process are first discounted at the default date and then divided by the exposure-at-default (EAD). Compared to market
LGD, the calculation of workout LGD is a little more complicated because the EAD, as well as all relevant cash flows, have to be determined in a concise way.
For a given lease contract the EAD is defined as the sum of the following three components:
• discounted residual value of the leased asset at maturity of the lease,
• discounted outstanding rentals up to the maturity of the lease,
• compounded overdue rentals. 7 The rating agency Moody´s measures LGD using the bid price on the defaulted instrument observed approximately 30 days following the date of default. (Moody´s, 2006, P. 21). 8 In addition, the method of implied market LGD exists. In this case, LGD is measured from the prices of non-defaulted risky bonds using an asset-pricing approach. For details see e.g. Schuermann (2004) .
The workout cash-flows consist of the revenue from asset resale (AR) as well as payments from other recovery sources (OS). AR corresponds to the discounted revenue the lessor received from the resale of the leased asset at the secondary market. If the asset could be re-rented to a third party, AR equals the present value of the payments of the new contract.
Cash-flows from other sources of recovery mainly contain rentals that have been paid after the default event. This happens, for example, if the insolvency practitioner decides to fulfill the leasing contract after the opening of the insolvency proceedings. Costs within the workout process (for example, broker fees, legal costs, or asset repossession costs) are not considered in this work. For discounting respectively compounding at the default date, we used the yield (internal rate of return) of the particular lease contract.
As mentioned above, the individual LGD of a defaulted lease is calculated as that fraction of the EAD that can neither be recovered by the asset resale value nor by other recovery payments. With regard to the subsequent analyses, we now introduce the following three
LGD concepts.
• Loss given default from asset resale (LGD1):
LGD1 = 1 − AR EAD .
• Loss given default from other recovery sources (LGD2):
LGD2 = 1 − OS EAD .
• Loss given default from complete recovery (LGD3):
Definition of Default and Resurrection Rates
A crucial issue in the context of the analysis of LGD is the definition of the default event.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision applies a rather wide default definition 9 .
Accordingly, a default is considered to have occurred if an obligor is past due more than 90 days on any material credit obligation or another event indicating unlikeliness to pay has taken place. Such an indication could be, for example, that the bank makes a charge-off or account-specific provision, consents to a distressed restructuring of the credit obligation, or has filed for the obligor´s bankruptcy.
However, most of these events do not seem to be adequate for leasing contracts. In contrast to a bank, which balances the credit obligation, a leasing company puts the leased asset into its balance sheet, so the indication of a charge-off cannot be applied. A delay of 90 days is also difficult to realize because leasing companies normally react earlier if the lessee is past due on his payments. Hence, most empirical studies consider a lease contract as defaulted when the leasing company has unilaterally cancelled the agreement because the lessee did not pay the scheduled rentals 10 . A drawback associated with this criterion is the fact that the date of the cancellation decision depends on the lessor´s internal policy. This may possibly lead to inconsistencies when the sample comprises contracts from several leasing companies.
Therefore we use the following alternative default definition in our study: a lease contract is defined as defaulted when it accesses the legal department of the lessor. Usually a leasing company transfers a contract to its legal department if the lessee is past due on two scheduled rentals or files for bankruptcy, whichever happens earlier. In the context of the BCBS definition, the access date to the legal department can be considered to be an event indicating the unlikeliness to pay of the lessee. Thus, our default criterion is compatible with the regulations in Basel II. Compared to a 90-days past due, it is, however, a little more severe as it takes effect earlier.
The application of our default definition includes the possibility that a lease contract is transferred to the legal department first, but leaves it again at a later date. This case can occur if the lessee did not actually default and the agreement is re-fulfilled duly. A contract that leaves the legal department we call " resurrected". In our data set, we can determine for each lease contract if it was resurrected or not 11 . We now introduce the so-called resurrection rate, denoted by XR, which describes the extent of resurrections for a given portfolio of lease contracts. Thus, XR is defined by: XR = Number of resurrected contracts Number of accesses to legal department .
As shown in table 3, resurrection is a quite frequent phenomenon in our data set. According to the different asset types, the resurrection rates range from 20.71% (machinery) to 39.13% (other assets). Overall, more than every fourth contract leaves the legal department because it was re-fulfilled correctly. With regard to the analysis of influencing factors on the variable LGD, it seems to be more appropriate to consider only the not-resurrected contracts, i.e. such cases where a resale of the leased asset actually took place. Thus, our total sample size for the calculation of
LGD averages in the following chapters amounts to 39,490 contracts.
Descriptive Analyses
Original Variables
In order to get an overview of the data, we present several descriptive statistics in this chapter. Table 4 provides information on the original variables that enter into the calculation of the LGD. In the case of machinery contracts, the average values for EAD, AR and OS are far above those of the other types, which can be explained by the higher initial values of the corresponding assets. The last two columns of the table reveal the contribution of AR and OS to the totality of the recovery cash-flows. It stands out that the fraction of other recoveries is quite high for ICT equipment (nearly 60%). This could be due to the fact that insolvency practitioners often continue to pay rentals for ICT contracts after default because these assets are essential for the going concern of the company 12 . For the other asset types the OS-fraction is somewhat lower: here, the resale value mostly drives recovery cash-flows. Table 4 : Descriptive statistics of exposure-at-default (EAD), asset resale (AR), and other recovery sources (OS) according to asset type.
Level and Dispersion of LGD
To obtain the average LGD for a given portfolio, individual
LGDs are weighted by the exposure-at-default of the contract (exposure-weighted arithmetic average). Table 5 exhibits the averages and the corresponding standard deviations for the three different LGD concepts, introduced in section 3.2, according to the asset type.
At 84.43%, the loss given default from asset resale (LGD1) for ICT contracts is much higher compared to the other asset classes. This looks plausible since these assets, for example personal computers, suffer from a rapid decrease in value because of the steady technological progress. Consequently, the revenues from asset disposal at the secondary market are generally lower, which leads to an increase of LGD.
By contrast, the averages of LGD1 for vehicles and machinery are more moderate. This could be due to the fact that the corresponding asset values are more stable over time (in the case of machinery) or the secondary markets are quite liquid (e.g. for cars). The high standard deviation for other assets might be explained by the heterogeneity within this asset class.
The loss given default from other recovery sources (LGD2) does not vary notably among the asset types. The values range from 70,73% (machinery) to 81,58% (vehicles). For ICT contracts, other recovery payments cover a higher portion of the EAD than the resale revenues (LGD2 < LGD1), which is caused by their higher fraction of total recovery (see table 4 ).
LGD3 indicates which fraction of the EAD can be recovered by neither the asset resale value nor other recovery sources. The comparison of the LGD3 averages among the asset types gives similar insights as in the case of LGD1. Whereas the values for vehicles,
LGD1 (%)
LGD2 (%)
LGD3 ( Table 5 : Loss given default by type of asset for different concepts:
LGD from asset resale (LGD1),
LGD from other recovery sources (LGD2), and LGD from total recovery (LGD3). Averages (AVG) and standard deviations (STD) are exposure-weighted.
machinery, and other assets lie within an interval between 20% and 35%, the figure for
ICT is much higher (61.84%).
For the entire portfolio of defaulted leases the LGD3 average is 31.59%. Compared to the minimum LGD for collateralized exposures in the Foundation IRB Approach of Basel II, which is 40%, this figure is somewhat lower 13 . This result suggests that it might be favorable for leasing companies -as long as they are subject to bank supervision 14 -to adopt the Advanced IRB Approach, where they are allowed to use their own LGD estimates in order to benefit from lower capital requirements. Table 6 summarizes the results of other empirical studies concerning the LGD of lease contracts and bank loans.
An appropriate comparison between workout
LGDs among different surveys is not straightforward because the exact evaluation of LGD often differs with regard to the default definition, the choice of the discount factor, and the cash-flows determining the recovery value.
The studies dealing with lease contracts, however, confirm our findings that the level of
LGD varies significantly depending on the type of the leased asset. In general, assets with relatively stable market values (for example real estate or machinery) and assets traded on liquid secondary markets (vehicles) benefit from lower LGDs. In contrast, for assets that lose value quite rapidly (such as ICT equipment) higher losses can be observed. However, 13 See BCBS (2004, § 295). Leases other than those that expose the bank to residual value risk will be accorded the same treatment as exposures collateralised by the same type of collateral (BCBS, 2004, § 523).
14 Leasing companies are not subject to supervisory review in Germany, but they are in other countries such as France, Italy, and Spain.
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Empirical distribution of LGD
We now look at the shape of the empirical LGD distribution whereas we focus on the LGD from total recoveries (LGD3). Figure 1 shows the histograms for the different asset types.
The four diagrams indicate that the LGD distributions are widely bimodal with peaks occurring at 0% and at around 100% 16 . In other words, the most likely results imply losing nothing or almost everything. In the case of vehicles, machinery, and other assets we see that the left mode (at 0%) is higher than the right one, which means that lower
LGDs are more common. For ICT equipment, in contrast, higher values tend to occur more frequently. Besides, it can be observed that the distributions are not completely symmetric, but exhibit a certain skewness towards negative LGDs (left-skewness). If LGD is measured using the workout method, negative LGD values are theoretically possible. If a given lease contract has a rather low EAD, but the leasing company achieves a high recovery from asset resale, the resulting LGD can be lower than zero, which corresponds to an economic gain from the asset. Since the histograms in figure 1 do not cover the complete range of the observations, we also computed the minimum, the 1%-quantile, and the 10%-quantile of the considered LGD distributions (see table 7 ). We see that LGDs for individual lease contracts are widely distributed, and extreme negative values especially occur quite often in our data set. The highest proportion of negative LGDs can be found in the asset class of machinery, where more than one third of all defaulted contracts have an individual LGD below zero. Table 7 : Negative values and selected quantiles of LGD3 distribution according to asset type.
5 Influence of the Business Cycle on LGD and XR
Design of the Study and Explanatory Variables
Within the scope of the Advanced IRB approach, the macroeconomic situation plays a pivotal role for the estimation of the loss given default. According to § 468 of the Basel II Consultative Document, the estimated LGD for a certain facility must reflect economic downturn conditions where necessary to capture the relevant risks. Moreover, the potential for the LGD to be higher than the long-run default-weighted average during a period when credit losses are substantially higher than average must be taken into account.
In this chapter, we try to find out how LGDs of defaulted lease contracts are sensitive to changes in the economic environment and if there can be recognized differences between
LGD concepts as well as between asset types. Because of the heterogeneous character of the segment of other assets we focus on only three asset types: vehicles, ICT, and machinery. The subsequent analyses are performed on exposure-weighted LGD averages over time, whereas we aggregate the individual LGDs both on annual and quarterly basis.
Since the year 2004 was not covered completely in the collection of the data, and therefore the number of observations is very low (see again We now list some variables that we reasoned could be potential drivers of the LGD. The theoretically expected effect of the particular variable is indicated by the sign " +" or " -" in parentheses 17 .
• GDP (-): Growth rate of the real gross domestic product in comparison to the preceding year resp. quarter.
• DD (+): Dummy variable for economic downturns (downturn dummy). DD takes the value of 1 during downturn periods and 0 otherwise 18 .
• IN V (-): Growth rate of real equipment investment in comparison to the preceding year resp. quarter Apart from the above-mentioned macroeconomic factors, the age of the lease at default, which is defined as the period between the origination date of the contract and the default date, might be a potential variable affecting the LGD 21 . In order to eliminate this effect when testing the impact of the economic environment, it seems to be necessary to introduce a control variable for the average age of the contracts within a respective year or quarter.
Unfortunately, our data set only contains very insufficient information concerning the age of the defaulted contracts. Hence, we have chosen a proxy variable, denoted by AGE, which is defined as the average exposure-at-default per contract of a certain year or quarter.
Thus AGE is defined as follows:
AGE ≈ EAD per contract = Sum of EAD Number of defaulted contracts . 17 For the acquisition of the data we used the information system " Genesis Online" of the German The macroeconomic factors were included in our regression model both individually and jointly. In terms of the SBC value, in most cases the model with only one factor proved to be the best choice. In a multivariate context an improvement of the SBC could rarely be achieved. In addition, due to multicollinearity, the regression coefficients were not jointly significant. Hence, we only exhibited the results of multiple regressions in selected cases (for example, with regard to the calculation of a downturn LGD in chapter 6).
LGD from asset resale
In this paragraph we concentrate on the variable LGD1, which is only based on the return from asset resale at the secondary market. From a theoretical point of view we can expect that a bad economic situation, represented for example by a low GDP growth, may cause decreasing prices at the secondary markets and therefore higher LGDs (negative relationship). Furthermore, an increase of insolvencies, expresssed by the variable IN S, should lead to a larger supply of used assets and (ceteris paribus) decreasing market prices and thus higher losses (positive relationship). 22 We performed the estimations in EViews 5.1. 23 A model with a lower SBC value is typically preferred.
First we analyse the segment of vehicles. Table 8 : Results of the regression analyses for vehicles with LGD1 as the dependent variable.
Newey-West-corrected standard errors of the coefficients are presented in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero on a confidence level of 90, 95, and 99% respectively. C denotes the intercept coefficient, T the length of the series, R 2 the coefficient of determination, and SBC the Schwarz Baysian Information Criterion.
It is striking that the estimated coefficients show the expected sign both on an annual and quarterly level. Besides, our control variable AGE is significant in most cases. Whereas the GDP and the Ifo indicators seem to have a weaker influence on LGD1, the equipment investment (on a quarterly basis) and the insolvency growth (on an annual basis) turn out to be significant drivers of LGD1 for this asset type. The significance of the downturn dummy variable DD indicates that the LGDs are higher when the macroeconomic conditions are very unfavorable. Additionally, we also displayed the results of two estimations with more than one macroeconomic factor in the last column of each subtable 24 . It turns out that the insolvency growth (annual data) as well as the equipment investment (quar- 24 We included those variables that were significant in the univariate regressions.
terly data) still stay significant, but the downturn dummy does not. Compared to the models with one factor, in the bivariate case the coefficient of determination rises up to 0.676 or 0.199 respectively. The SB criteria shows a lower value only in the annual case.
Annual Data (T = 11)
LGD Table 9 : Results of the regression analyses for ICT with LGD1 as the dependent variable. NeweyWest-corrected standard errors of the coefficients are presented in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero on a confidence level of 90, 95, and 99% respectively.
Next, we turn to the class of ICT assets. The results of the estimated regressions are presented in table 9. As for vehicles, the coefficients of the macro-factors have the theoretically expected sign, but significances can only be observed when quarterly data is considered.
This suggests that the loss severities of ICT assets might be more sensitive to short-term variations of the business cycle. Concretely, the LGD1 is significantly influenced by the growth of equipment investment as well as by the Ifo indices. There the current business situation, expressed by IBS, seems to have a stronger impact on the resale returns than the business expectations (IBE). Compared to the case of vehicles, the downturn dummy is not significant for ICT assets. In a multivariate context, neither joint significance of the coefficients nor lower SBC values could be achieved.
Apart from the dummy variable DD, in the segment of machinery none of the analysed macro-variables shows a significant impact on LGD1 (see results in table 10 ). In addition, the signs of the coefficients for equipment investment are not robust with regard to a change from annual to quarterly data. Regressions with more than one macroeconomic factor did not deliver any further insights, though we do not list them here.
LGD On the whole, our estimation results indicate that there is a certain cyclical variability of the loss given default from asset resale. The magnitude of this impact, however, is different among the three asset types.
Especially in the class of vehicles, we found some evidence for an impact of the macroeconomic environment on LGD1 both on annual and quarterly level. This result might be due to the fact that the market for used vehicles, particularly for cars, is quite well-developed and liquid. Thus, demand and supply are sensitive to changes of the economic situation in the expected way.
As already mentioned, the LGDs of ICT equipment seem to react to a lesser extent on annual level. The rapid decrease in value of these assets possibly dominates the impact of the long-term development of the economy so that only short-term effects remain relevant.
Compared to the other asset types, LGDs of machinery leases are least sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. This result may be explained by the fact that machinery assets can often be characterized by a high asset specificity, which means that they have rather few opportunities for alternative use and therefore relatively poor demand 25 . Thus the secondary market for machinery is very fragmented and quite illiquid. Apparently, the amount of the revenue from asset resale rather depends on the properties of the asset itself than of the general economic situation.
Furthermore, it is striking that in no case the variable GDP shows a significant influence on LGD1. By contrast, the downturn dummy, which has been defined for extreme negative GDP growth rates, proves to be significant in several regressions. Thus the returns from asset disposal seem to behave quite robustly against regular GDP changes but decrease strongly in very adverse situations. In addition, equipment investment determines LGD1
to a greater extent than the GDP. This turns out to be plausible, as the GDP also comprises components (for example, exports) that are not in direct relationship with the situation at the secondary markets.
LGD from other recovery sources
The following paragraph is dedicated to the analysis of recovery sources other than from asset resale. In this case we can also expect a negative relationship between LGD2 and the economic situation. In times of economic downturns, the chances for a going concern of a defaulted company are generally worse. Consequently, lessees might not be able to accomplish their scheduled rentals after default has occured, which leads to higher values for LGD2.
As our results for annual and quarterly data are very similar, we only present them for the latter (see table 11 ).
Aside from the downturn dummy for vehicles and the insolvencies for ICT equipment, whose coefficients are significant at the 90%-level, none of the considered macroeconomic factors has a significant influence on LGD2. This finding suggests that the economic cycle LGD 2 Table 11 : Results of the regression analyses for the asset classes vehicles, ICT and machinery with LGD2 as the dependent variable, based on quarterly data. Newey-West-corrected standard errors of the coefficients are presented in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero on a confidence level of 90, 95, and 99% respectively.
does not have an impact on the variation of the LGD from other recovery sources.
To what extent lessees continue to pay their rentals after the default event seems to depend more on company-related factors or the policy of the insolvency practitioner than on the general economic conditions.
LGD from Complete Recovery
Having analysed the two recovery components separately in the preceding paragraphs, we now look at the variable LGD3 which is based on recoveries both from asset resale and from late rental payments. The corresponding regression analyses are presented in table 12 . As before, we focus on quarterly data. The estimation results on annual level are shown in the appendix.
If we compare the results for the three asset types, we can state that LGD3 is influenced in different ways by the variables under consideration. While we find several significant coefficients in the class of vehicles (Variables DD, INV, IBS and INS), there are no significances at all for ICT assets. In the case of machinery contracts, only the downturn dummy proves to be very significant.
In order to give possible reasons for these findings, we investigate in which way the totality of recovery is determined by its two components, asset resale and other payments. Therefore we perform univariate regressions in which we regress LGD3 on LGD1 and LGD2
respectively. The estimation results can be found in table 13.
The significance of the regression coefficients as well as the differences in the values of R 2 indicate that for vehicle leases the variation of LGD3 is basically driven by the returns from asset resale. On annual level, LGD1 explains nearly 80% of the variance of LGD3.
In contrast, R 2 only accounts for 7,4% in the regression with LGD2. In other words, other recovery sources determine LGD3 by far less. Thus the relatively strong influence of macroeconomic variables on LGD3 is primarily due to the reaction of the resale revenues.
For ICT assets the situation is vice versa. In this segment, other cash-flows not only add up to nearly 60% of the total recoveries (see again table 4), but also determine strongly their variation over time. R 2 accounts for 85,7% on annual and 69,9% on quarterly level respectively. Since LGD2 has been proved to be cycle-resistant, LGD3 is very insensitive to macroeconomic factors, too.
In the class of machinery leases, LGD3 is also more strongly determined by LGD2 than by LGD1. In this context, the high significance of the downturn dummy seems to be a little surprising.
We conclude that the loss severities of vehicle leases are most sensitive to changes of Vehicles, Quarterly Data (T = 42)
LGD 3 macroeconomic conditions. Hence, the estimation of a downturn LGD, which will be carried out in chapter , is primarily justified for this asset type.
LGD 3
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Annual Data (T = 11) 
Resurrection Rates
The average LGD of a given portfolio of lease contracts is dependent on the definition of the default event. As mentioned in section 3.3, the underlying default criteria in this study is very wide, which implies that resurrections occur frequently. As the magnitude of resurrections, measured by the resurrection rate, influences the average LGD, it is important for lessors to know which factors are responsible for the variation of this variable.
This question will be tackled in the following paragraph.
At first, we look at the evolution of the resurrection rates over time. Figure 2 outlines the graphs for the different asset types based on annual data. Since we have only a very small number of resurrected contracts for which we know the exact access date to the legal department, we had to pass on analyses on quarterly level. The plot shows that the resurrection rates behave rather similarly over the years among the three asset classes: the time series of vehicles and ICT especially are highly correlated 26 .
Next we analyse the resurrection rates according to their cyclical variability. In contrast to the LGD, we guess that resurrection rates are positively correlated with the business cycle. In times of economic upturns, it can be anticipated that it is more likely that financial distress of lessees is only temporary so that the number of contracts leaving the 26 The correlation coefficient between these two series is 0.77 and differs significantly from zero at the 95%-level. legal department is supposed to be higher. On the contrary, downturn situations should imply lower resurrection rates, too.
In order to test the impact of the economic environment on resurrection rates, we carried out regressions with XR as the dependent variable and the macro-factors already used in the previous analyses. Some selected results are exhibited in The equipment investment as well as the insolvencies prove to be very significant, with the expected sign in all three asset segments. Similar to the results of the analysis of the
LGD, the GDP seems to have a weaker influence on XR. The corresponding coefficient is only significant for machinery contracts. The downturn dummy is insignificant in all regressions, although we did not provide these results. Bivariate regressions with the regressors INS and INV did not lead to an improvement of the SBC value, which is attributed to multicollinearity of these variables.
Summarizing our findings concerning resurrection rates, we can recognize some evidence for a cyclical variability on annual level. In contrast to resale revenues, the resurrection rates probably depend on the lessee and his financial situation rather than on the particular asset. This might explain the little differences among the results for the different asset segments. However, because of the relatively small sample size of eleven years and the lack of possibility of a validation with quarterly data, these results should be taken with a grain of salt.
6 Approach for the determination of a downturn LGD
Basic Idea
In § 468 of its Consultative Document the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision requires that the estimated LGD for a certain facility must reflect economic downturn conditions, where necessary, to capture the relevant risks. Besides, it says that this LGD, henceforth called " downturn LGD", cannot be less than the long-run default-weighted average LGD within the data source for that type of facility. However, the committee does not describe exactly in which way the estimation of a downturn LGD has to be carried out.
In this chapter, we propose a simple approach for how banks or leasing companies can obtain a downturn LGD for a particular type of asset. The basic idea is to estimate the downturn LGD, denoted with LGD * , subject to n macroeconomic (i.e. systematic) risk factors RF :
An important condition for the application of this approach is the existence of a stable (significant) relationship between the LGD and the particular risk factors, for example, in terms of a linear regression model. Note that the possible danger of multicollinearity must be kept in mind if more than one single risk factor is used.
Concretely, we estimate the realization of LGD * by substituting a sufficient unfavorable realization of the particular risk factor into the estimated equation. Assuming a linear regression model, we can write
The coefficientsβ 0 ,β 1 ,. . .,β n have to be estimated from historical data. Critical values for RF i could be, for example, the most unfavorable realization of the particular factor during the observation period or, as a less conservative scenario, a certain quantile of its historical distribution.
Empirical example
In this paragraph, we demonstrate the estimation of a downturn LGD with an example based on our data set. We refer to the LGD from all recovery sources (LGD3) which we consider as relevant from a regulatory point of view. The impact of the economic cycle has been already analysed in section 5.4. The results from table 12 show that the LGDs of vehicle leases are rather sensitive to macroeconomic conditions. Thus we carry out our example for this asset type.
As risk factors we considered the following four variables for which we identified significant relationships with LGD3: the downturn dummy, the equipment investment, the Ifo index business situation, and the number of insolvencies 27 . In addition to the most adverse realization, which represents the worst case, we choose the 5%-quantile and the 10%-quantile, denoted by q 0,05 and q 0,1 , as critical values for our risk factors 28 . LGDs are more conservative throughout than the long-run default-weighted average, which is in line with the requirements from §468.
Conclusion
This study is devoted to the investigation of the impact of the economic cycle on loss given defaults and resurrection rates of defaulted lease contracts belonging to three asset classes:
vehicles, ICT equipment, and machinery. For this purpose, we carried out regression analyses both on annual and quarterly level using different macroeconomic factors as regressors.
The LGD based on the return from asset resale at the secondary market turns out to show a greater cyclical variability than the LGD from other recovery sources such as late rentals. Presumably, the latter is more strongly influenced by the internal strategy of the lessee (or the insolvency practitioner) than by the macroeconomic environment.
Looking at the LGD that comes from all recovery cash-flows we found that the sensitivity to economic conditions varies considerably from one asset type to another. In the case of vehicle contracts, the LGD variation over time is mostly driven by the revenues from the resale of the asset. Therefore, vehicle leases react quite strongly to changes in the economic situation. In contrast, for LGDs of ICT equipment, which are primarily determined by other recovery cash-flows, there is no significant evidence for an impact of the business cycle. We obtain a similar result for machinery assets, which may be explained by the fact that the corresponding secondary markets are fragmented and rather illiquid.
Concerning the factors influencing LGD, the equipment investment and the Ifo index business situation (on quarterly level) turn out to be the most significant variables. The dummy variable that indicates an economic downturn is often significant as well, whereas the GDP growth proves to be insignificant in nearly all regressions. This result suggests that loss severities are quite stable in situations of normal economic activity but increase substantially during downturn periods.
In addition, we pointed out how a downturn LGD for a certain asset segment can be calculated in a quite simple and intuitive way. We demonstrated the proposed procedure with an empirical example for vehicle leases and different macroeconomic risk factors. Our estimated downturn
LGDs always exceed the long-run default-weighted average and are consequently in line with the requirements of the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision.
Furthermore, we introduced the concept of the resurrection rate, which measures the extent of resurrections due to a withdrawal of the default event. According to their cyclical variability on annual level, we found out that resurrection rates are significantly influenced by the equipment investment as well as the evolution of company insolvencies in all analysed asset classes.
On the whole, the results of our study already provide certain empirical insights for the credit risk management of leasing companies. However, for a comprehensive estimation model in terms of the Advanced IRB Approach, it is essential to take into account further variables that have an impact on the LGD. In addition to macroeconomic factors, such a model could include, for example, the maturity of the lease, the age of the contract at default, the type of contract, or lessee-related characteristics such as industry, company size, or legal form. Perhaps these variables are able to explain the variation of other recovery sources in a better way than macroeconomic factors.
With regard to the development of a meaningful LGD model, it is therefore necessary that more detailed data containing adequate variables be made available. In general, it can be expected that a successful implementation in the context of the Advanced IRB Approach should be associated with better internal ratings and, consequently, more favorable refinancing conditions for leasing companies.
A Results of regression analyses for LGD3 (Annual
Data)
Vecicles, Annual Data (T = 11)
LGD Table 16 : Results of the regression analyses for the asset types vehicles, ICT and machinery with
LGD3 as the dependent variable, based on annual data. Newey-West-corrected standard errors of the coefficients are presented in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero on a confidence level of 90, 95, and 99% respectively.
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